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Introductions & Welcome
James Keyte
FCLI Director and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham Law School;
Director of Global Development, The Brattle Group
MR. KEYTE: Good morning, everybody.
get started while people are filing in.

I’ll

I’m not going

to say anything interesting.
Welcome to the 45th Annual Conference on
International Antitrust Law and Policy.

It’s my fifth

year with the conference.
I apologize for the early date, but Fordham
is in its 100th year and took up some later dates.
Next year we’ll be back in mid-September or so.
We’re proud at Fordham to keep the
conference as an international meeting place to
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exchange ideas, to debate issues in a civilized
manner, to look for areas of convergence, to discuss
areas of divergence.
It seems that it was just a handful of years
ago that I think everybody thought there was going to
be more convergence, and certainly there has been a
lot of convergence across mergers, cartels, Section 1
and 101 issues.

But today there is a fair amount of

divergence in the area of monopoly; dominance; ideas
about leveraging, which is a fairly dead doctrine in
the United States with Trinko, but is alive and well
in the European Union and elsewhere; there is the
Intel decision and the implications of that; and there
may be down the road other big-name decisions that
will clarify things in the European Union.
Yesterday we had an Economics Workshop with
The Brattle Group in the afternoon and Compass Lexecon
in the morning.

They really were fantastic workshops

where they delved very deeply into some merger issues,
remedies, the AMEX decision, and structural modeling.
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We will continue to do the Workshop and try to get as
many young practitioners, enforcers, even young
economists.

It’s just a fantastic program.

It’s great also to have an international
group that gets exposed to these discussions so that
there really is a cross-border dialogue of some of the
economic principles that often lead the way on
enforcement and policy decisions.
The three panels for today fit into exactly
what we try to choose, which is issues that are
topical and cutting edge.
Antitrust and Populism.
progressivism.

First we will have
We could call it

I don’t know what the right word

really is, but we’ll probably hear that clarified.
Eleanor Fox will moderate that.

All Things Vertical

is really just picking up on what I think is an area
of continued divergence.
that panel.

Judge Ginsburg will moderate

And then Emerging Issues in Health Care,

which are always topical and complex.
Sokol will lead that.
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But first we will have our two keynote
speakers for this morning, Makan Delrahim, Assistant
Attorney General of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
who has proven to be quite a force, not predictable
but extremely active across all the antitrust topics
and is doing a fantastic job, and we’ll love to hear
what he has to say.

For the, at least on my watch,

third or fourth time, Johannes Laitenberger of DGCOMP, who we always pepper with what we think are
tough questions and he always handles them quite
easily.
I will remind everybody that one of the
benefits here is we’ll do the keynotes back-to-back
without interruption, and then I’ll lead with a
question or two, and then the audience can ask
questions.

So start getting those ready.

interesting and fun.
Makan, I’ll turn it over to you.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

It could be

5

Keynote Remarks
Makan Delrahim
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice
“Come Together”: Victories and New Challenges for the International
Antitrust Community
MR. DELRAHIM:
thanks to Fordham.

Thank you so much, James, and

It’s an honor for me to be here

amongst so many friends and colleagues, many of whom
for many years and decades — it’s my maybe second
decade now in the business of the enforcement side —
many familiar faces and friends throughout the years.
There are folks in the audience again that
humble me being here because of their contributions
not only to antitrust but to specifically
international antitrust, many folks amongst us who I
have looked up to for many years in my career and in
my studies.

We have folks like Judge Doug Ginsburg,

who not only was the head of the Antitrust Division
but had an illustrious career, has one, but still
contributes to this field.

Of course, President Mario

Monti, who I think had one of the most important
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impacts in Europe and in the area of convergence in
the antitrust field, and he, despite his incredible
many accomplishments afterwards, and pivotal
accomplishments, in the late 2000s in Europe still
continues to contribute in this world.

And of course

Fred Jenny, my friend not only from the judiciary in
France and the Competition Committee of the OECD, but
his continued involvement both in academia at New York
University (NYU) and other places.

And representing a

lot of us at the International Competition Network
(ICN), Andreas Mundt, who we met when he was at the
Bundeskartellamt and we had similar jobs as deputies
for international when he worked with Dr. Ulf Böge,
and he continues to be the President of the ICN and to
lead us.
These are folks along the way that remind me
of that old Eagles song, “You may check out when you
want, but you can never leave!”1 — in a positive way
because we all contribute.

1

Hotel California (1976).
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us, including me, does in the future, I hope that we
all continue to contribute to this field because it is
so important and it has been such a civilized way of
working towards the convergence that we all strive
for.
Again I would like to thank James for all
his work, and Barry Hawk over the years, almost four
decades, where this forum has been such an important
forum for such exchanges of ideas amongst the
enforcers, academics, and members of the bar.
It is an honor to follow in the footsteps of
former Assistant Attorney Generals for Antitrust
appointed by both Republicans and Democrats over the
years.

At one time or another they have all been

speakers at this conference.
A little less than a year ago, I had the
great privilege of addressing the audience at NYU Law
School for my very first remarks as Assistant Attorney
General.

At the time I focused on international

engagement and global dialogue, which is an area of
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significant importance to me and obviously to
everybody in this room.
Today presents an occasion for me to reflect
on this past year, on the international engagement we
have had during this time, and on what the
international antitrust community has accomplished
over the long term.

I also want to reflect on how we

as a community have been able to achieve so much and
what we hope to do in the future.
As I was preparing to make these remarks, I
recalled an article that I commend folks to read,
published in the Harvard Business Review several years
ago, called “How the Best of the Best Get Better and
Better.”

It was written by a sports psychologist, Dr.

Graham Jones.

It grabbed my attention because it

deals with how humans keep improving.

How do we

continue to break new barriers even when it seems that
we are striving to achieve the impossible?

How do we

surpass what we perceive to be our limits?
English runner Roger Bannister, the first to
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run a mile in under four minutes, answered that
question this way:

“Doctors and scientists said that

breaking the four-minute mile was impossible, that one
would die in the attempt.

Thus, when I got up from

the track after collapsing at the finish line, I
figured I was dead.”
The secret, it seems, is to forget about the
limits.

Although Dr. Jones wrote his article for

sports stars and business leaders, his advice is
relevant to us as members of the international
antitrust community.

It explains many of our

successes and it is instructive about where we go from
here.
The first thing we must do is focus on the
long term.

Dr. Jones noted that “The road to long-

term success is paved with small achievements.”

As

antitrust enforcers, we are required to spend much of
our time making quick decisions, meeting immediate
deadlines, sometimes responding to press leaks — as I
had to do and excused myself from part of the meetings

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

10

yesterday — and this may not always leave us with the
time to reflect on the big challenges that we face
over the longer term.
When I look back at my predecessors and what
they have said about international antitrust
enforcement, both at Fordham and in other
international settings, I was struck by how far we
have come.

I’m going to cover a few of those just to

show us where we have come and where we can go.
In 1978, then-Assistant Attorney General
John Shenefield, a friend of mine and a fellow
Antitrust Modernization Commission Commissioner,
highlighted a lack of consensus in the world of
antitrust enforcement, concluding that “significant
differences in local political and economic
philosophies and the lack of an effective
international administrative mechanism preclude for
the foreseeable future the development of
supernational regulation.”
He lamented dissension among the United

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

11

States, Canada, and Great Britain regarding the issues
of extraterritoriality and “look forward to a world
where the vacuum is filled by consensus on a vigorous
antitrust policy and the international mechanisms to
implement it.”
His remarks did not signal much optimism
that consensus on the substance of the antitrust laws
or the scope of its application would be realized
anytime in the near term.
In 1981 we began to see some consensus on
extraterritorial jurisdiction when then-Assistant
Attorney General Bill Baxter addressed the ABA Section
of Antitrust Law at Georgetown.

At the time, AAG

Baxter predicted that while disputes about alleged
extraterritorial jurisdiction existed, “as the number
of nations embracing antitrust policies expands, the
number of conflicts will decrease.”
Over the next decade, not only were his
predictions of global expansion realized, but
developments in the United States clarified the

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

12

extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law and paved
the way for better international cooperation.
In 1982 the United States Congress enacted
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act to address
the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign
conduct.

The “domestic effects” test contained in

that law, and subsequently clarified by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Empagran,2 has proved a useful way to
think about extraterritoriality, not only for us in
the United States but in many of our sister
jurisdictions.

Today there is general consensus on

the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
antitrust laws.
While the adoption of competition laws
around the world signaled increasing consensus
regarding the need for antitrust enforcement, it
created some challenges as well.
In 1993, when Anne Bingaman was the
Assistant Attorney General, her speech at this

2

Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 2004 WL 1300131 (2004).
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conference recognized the diversity of laws and
challenged the international community to look for new
ways to cooperate.
It was just six years later, again here at
Fordham, that then-Assistant Attorney General Joel
Klein noted the exceptional convergence regarding
cartel enforcement and praised the cooperation that
had resulted in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) hardcore cartel
recommendations.
Of course we did not stop there.

Acting

Assistant Attorney General Doug Melamed said at
Fordham in 2000 that “our goal should be to achieve a
reasonable degree of analytical and operational
coherence in antitrust enforcement.”

But he

acknowledged that with ninety or more antitrust
agencies at the time it would be “a formidable task.”
He envisioned a global competitive
initiative, which, by the time Assistant Attorney
General Charles James appeared at Fordham here in
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2001, had become a concrete proposition called the
Global Competition Network.

Today, of course, we call

this organization the International Competition
Network (ICN).
While it makes me feel old, I admit, and
even celebrate, that there are many talented young
lawyers at the Justice Department and around the world
who can’t remember a time before the ICN.

Robust and

regular international discussion and cooperation has
become our way of life, to do that civilly and with
respect for each other’s agencies.
The ICN is an example of just how much
change is possible if we put our minds to it.

In a

recent speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library in my hometown in California, U.S. Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo spoke about the current political
and humanitarian crises in my birth country of Iran.
While Secretary Pompeo was addressing a very different
set of challenges than the ones we face in the
international competition community, his words
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resonated with me.

Of tackling major obstacles, he

said, “I always remind people who think something’s
not possible, or think the time horizon will be
measured in centuries not hours, that things change.”
Within the antitrust community we have
effected enormous positive change thanks to those who
had the creativity and vision to conceive of long-term
goals and the tenacity to take each incremental step
after incremental step.
in this room.

Many of those folks are here

Some of them are not, including our

good friend Jim Rill, who is not here today but had
incredible contributions during his leadership of the
International Competition Policy Advisory
Committee (ICEPAC) during Attorney General Reno’s
tenure.
Looking back at all we have done in the four
decades that we have been working together and meeting
here at Fordham, I am deeply impressed by what we have
accomplished by focusing on the long term.
The second pillar of Dr. Jones’s philosophy
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of constant betterment is the ability to reinvent
ourselves.
improvement.

We must repeatedly embark on new cycles of
While stability and predictability are

vitally important in law enforcement and in government
generally, we should never stop questioning whether we
can change in ways that will improve our efficacy.
Again, Commissioner Monti’s improvements in
the European Commission are a living example of that,
and our friends in China and the changes they have
made in reforming their laws after just a short ten
years is yet another good example of the improvements
that they have made in reinventing themselves.
In my years as Assistant Attorney General we
have taken several initiatives aimed at reinventing
our policies at the Justice Department, for the better
we hope.
For example, the Division convened a series
of public roundtables at which participants from all
sides weighed in on issues of regulatory reform,
including the issues of anticompetitive regulations.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

17

We have also embarked on a project to
terminate over 1000 outdated consent decrees which
have for years remained on our courts’ dockets, and in
some cases have even created anticompetitive market
conditions themselves.
On the international front, we have also
continually revisited our views.

We have attempted to

articulate our international competition policy as
clearly as possible, adjusting our International
Guidelines to keep them timely and relevant.

We

issued our original Guidelines jointly with the
Federal Trade Commission in 1977 and then revisited
them a decade later under Assistant Attorney General
Rick Rule in 1988.

The 1988 Guidelines expressly

recognize the increasing relevance of foreign
competition in every aspect of enforcement, reflecting
the rapid increase in internationalization.
Our 1995 Guidelines emphasized global
economic interdependence and the related issues of
comity, mutual legal assistance, and the nexus between
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antitrust and trade.
In 2017, finally, we issued our most recent
update, reflecting a world in which case cooperation
and policy discussions are almost everyday events, and
we continue to think about improvements we can make in
our agencies to do further.
We also strive to redefine and share our
thinking through bilateral meetings and speeches.

For

example, our International Deputy AAG Roger Alford has
mentioned recently “we are giving a great deal of
thought to how we implement the principles of comity,
not just in situations where two jurisdictions’
remedies post a direct conflict, but also in
situations in which one country’s remedy conflicts
with important interests, such as pro-innovation
policies of another jurisdiction.”
Another component of constant improvement is
to draw inspiration from others.

Dr. Jones described

this as “consciously create[ing] situations in which
their elite performers push one another to levels they
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would never reach if they were working with lessaccomplished colleagues.”

It is common in sports for

elite athletes to train together.

Likewise, it is

common in the business world for top executives to
push each other to excel, to compete.
While we and our international colleagues
are not competing in any traditional sense, we can and
do look to each other as sources of inspiration and
improvement.
On Wednesday I had the great pleasure of
attending the Heads of Agency Workshop here that
precedes this conference each year.

The discussion,

which ranged from everyday obstacles we all confront,
such as the use of IT in our investigations, to the
cutting-edge issues presented by the digital economy
and unilateral conduct, left me feeling invigorated to
tackle the next challenge and confident in our
abilities to take it on.
I notice the same effect when I engage with
my international colleagues at bilateral meetings and
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at the ICN and OECD.

As a community we have built a

table infrastructure that ensures that we learn from
each other, challenging each other, and continually
improving together.
That leads me to the final ingredient for
improvement that I want to highlight today.

That is

the need to celebrate our victories, even on a
telephone.

Of course we all enjoy an occasion to get

together and to share a drink or a meal, particularly
when it’s in Paris.

But, as Dr. Jones writes, “The

most important function of affirming victory is to
provide encouragement for attempts at even tougher
stretch goals.”
While we have much to celebrate, I submit
that there are new goals towards which we can and
should strive.
In a recent speech, my friend and colleague,
our United States Deputy Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein, recounted an anecdote about the founding
of the United States government, noting that Benjamin
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Franklin described the government as “a republic, if
you can keep it.”

Rod said that Franklin “used the

word ‘keep’ as an active verb.

It means there are

things you need to do, if you want to preserve it.
What Franklin had in mind is analogous to the ‘keeper
of the flame,’ a person tasked to keep the fire
burning.

If you are a keeper of the flame, your

assignment is not just to watch.

You need to take

action to keep the spark alive.”
It is in this spirit that we must identify
and pursue new goals.

As you know, together with many

of our enforcement colleagues, we at the Division and
the Federal Trade Commission are working towards a
Multilateral Framework on Procedures (MFP) that will
encapsulate and allow its signatories to commit to
each other to adhere to the fundamental procedural
norms that many of us, if not all of us, already
recognize and agree to.
Already the agencies that have participated
in the discussions so far come from different legal
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traditions, and operate in both administrative and
prosecutorial systems.

What may have seemed

impossible at the outset is looking more and more
possible every day.

Earlier this week, we joined

representatives from dozens of other agencies to
discuss the draft text of this MFP.

Many good

comments and many suggestions were made, and I am
happy to report that the areas of consensus far
outweigh those that require additional discussion.
While we still have plenty of work to do on
this, I hope that you will indulge me in imagining
that fifteen years from now — perhaps at the 60th
Annual Fordham Conference — we will look back at the
MFP as an important instrument that improved the
quality of our enforcement decisions and increased
public trust in antitrust enforcement worldwide.
Fair procedures are inextricably linked to
good substantive outcomes.

To quote Rod Rosenstein

once more, “[t]he rule of law requires us to reserve
judgment until we have heard from all parties and
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completed a fair process.

You cannot reach reliable

factual conclusions unless you first weigh the
credible evidence.

You cannot offer reasoned legal

opinions unless you consider conflicting arguments.”
Committing ourselves to providing parties
with access to evidence, transparent decision-making,
and judicial review, to name a few, will help us to
ensure that our decisions are thoughtful, thorough,
and respected.

An unequivocal public commitment to

these principles will also demonstrate to our own
citizens and to those of other countries that we
conduct ourselves with the highest degree of integrity
and that they can have faith in both our processes and
our conclusions.
I commend folks to read one of my personal
legal heroes, a 1940 speech by later Justice Robert
Jackson, at the time the Attorney General and before
that the Head of the Antitrust Division and many other
jobs he had in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
Administration, and particularly a quote where he
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talks about the power of law enforcement, “the power
that we have and the humility with which we must
exercise that.”
Although I have been in my position as
Assistant Attorney General for slightly less than one
year, I have seen firsthand the enormous progress we
have made together over the last two decades.
As the Deputy for Appellate and
International in the early 2000s, I participated in
one of the early ICN annual conferences, where some of
the best minds in international antitrust enforcement
gathered to chart a course for collaboration and
cooperation, and I am only heartened to see many of
those folks continue that progress in this room.
The founding of the ICN was a huge
accomplishment, and perhaps things could have stopped
there.

Instead, the best got even better, thanks to

long-term planning, constant reinvention, mutual
respect, and mutual inspiration.

Now let’s keep going

and let’s actively keep that spark alive.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

25

Thank you.
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Johannes Laitenberger
Director-General of DG Competition, EU Commission
Enforcement of Competition Rules in the European Union:
The Globalized Economy in the Digital Age
MR. LAITENBERGER:

Ladies and gentlemen,

first of all, I would like to thank as well and to pay
tribute to James and to Barry for the accomplishment
that is the Fordham Conference.
It is an honor to be part of this fortyfive-year-old history, and it is indeed humbling to be
able to speak in front of such a distinguished
audience.

With eminent members of the judiciary, like

Judge Ginsburg and Advocate-General Wahl; with people
of my generation as EU competition enforcers, like
Prof. Senator Monti, who has done so much for EU
competition enforcement and who remains an
inspirational force to this day; with colleagues like
Fred and Andreas who keep our community together; with
our American colleagues from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) like Maureen Ohlhausen and the team
of the DOJ present here today; and all the other heads
of authorities, economists, lawyers, it is a vibrant
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forum and it is a great pleasure to be here.
I would like to talk today about enforcement
of competition rules in the European Union with a
focus on the globalized economy in the digital age.

I

will do so using two lines of argument: first, I will
make a broad case for convergence and cooperation in
our globalized economy; and then I will move to a few
illustrations of the approaches taken by the European
Union in enforcement in digital markets.
I can see from the program that the first
panel in the afternoon has “convergence and
divergence” in its title.
notes.

We have not exchanged

It’s just an instance of unplanned

convergence, unplanned but unsurprising.
For decades, EU authorities have been part
of an increasingly vigorous group advocating for
international cooperation and convergence in
competition enforcement.

Convergence is predicated

upon open markets with compatible standards, and the
past decades have seen strong developments in that
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sense.
Now, amid fresh tensions in global trade,
serious reflections are in order on how to keep
momentum.

If one needs proof of the benefits of open

markets, one needs look no further than the exchanges
between the European Union and the United States.

I

trust that the genius loci will allow me to take this
as an example.
In 2017 merchandise exports from Europe to
the United States were worth $430 billion while the
United States exported merchandise to Europe for a
record $284 billion, pushing the peak imbalance of
2015 down 6 percent.
As to services, in 2016 Europe’s exports to
the United States amounted to $212 billion while the
United States had a $67 billion trade surplus in
services with exports to Europe reaching $279 billion.
But these figures are dwarfed by foreign
direct investment.

In 2017 total U.S. investment in

Europe exceeded $2 trillion and the corresponding flow
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from Europe to the United States was $168 billion,
over half of all FDI inflows into the United States.
In addition, in 2016 U.S.-controlled
companies in Europe recorded $720 billion in output
while that of European affiliates in the United States
was $584 billion.

The combined output is staggering.

It is larger than the GDP of many countries.
Given this level of integration between
Europe and the United States, we can speak accurately
of a trans-Atlantic economy.

As many as 50 million

jobs depend on it on both sides of the Atlantic.
Similar developments can be shown for other
regions of the planet.
This is not a zero-sum game in which the
winnings of some are necessarily offset by the losses
of others.

As EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe

Vestager said in a memorable speech earlier this week,3
“The world has changed vastly for the better.

3

And

Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, “Fighting Fear with Factfulness – and Engagement,”
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most of that change happened in the last few
generations.”
At the same time, this development is not a
deus ex machina.

In her speech Margrethe Vestager

reminds, for example, of the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, almost to the day ten years ago, and the
financial and economic crisis that followed.
There is a need for public policies to make
sure that the opportunities are for the many, not just
a few, and that those who cannot avail themselves from
these opportunities are not left behind.

As Margrethe

Vestager put it, “We still have work to do, to make
sure that trade is fair as well as free.”

She goes on

stressing that also competition policy and enforcement
“keep the market working fairly for consumers.”

In a

global and digital world, this is more than ever a
shared challenge and task.
On the strength of these arguments, I am
thus convinced that competition enforcers need to

Speech at Bruegel Annual Meeting. Brussels, 3 September 2018, available at
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continue working with each other in multilateral and
bilateral efforts to make sure our rules are
compatible and convergent.

This is all the more

urgent in an integrated business environment shaken by
protectionist shivers.
According to the latest World Trade
Organization Annual Report issued in the spring,
growth in global trade in 2017 was the strongest since
2011.

But trade tensions have escalated in 2018 and,

as WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo remarked, “we
can take nothing for granted.”
Competition enforcers are among the actors
who can defend the open rule-based system that has
created the conditions for the positive global
economic performance of the past years and decades.
As far as the European Commission is
concerned, this is not merely “talking the talk.”

We

now cooperate with our sister agencies in all cases,
with significant implications beyond our jurisdiction.

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/fightingVerbatim Transceedings, Inc.
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Between 2010 and 2017, to give you some figures, we
cooperated with competition agencies outside of the
European Union in 65 percent of all cartel cases and
in 54 percent of complex merger cases.

There is no

doubt that we also “walk the walk.”
Beyond our daily practice we have also been
very active in multilateral fora, such as the
International Competition Network and the OECD’s
Competition Commission, and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law
and Policy.
As to bilateral agreements, I’m happy to
report continued momentum.
In early June, Margrethe Vestager and
Alejandra Palacios, the Chairwoman of the Federal
Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) of Mexico
signed and Administrative Agreement on Cooperation.
This agreement provides for a framework for dialogue

fear-factfulness-and-engagement_en
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on competition policy issues, for sharing views, and
nonconfidential information on individual cases.

This

is just the last example of bilateral initiatives
tailor-made for competition policy and enforcement.
The first fully fledged cooperation
agreement was of course signed with the United States
in 1991.

Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and

Switzerland followed over the years.
The cooperation agreement with Switzerland
is a so-called second-generation agreement, allowing
under certain conditions to exchange confidential
information between the competition authorities.
Second-generation agreements are also in preparation
with other jurisdictions.
In addition, memoranda of understanding are
now in place with a number of further countries:
Brazil since 2009, Russia in 2011, India in 2013,
South Africa in 2016; and China in 2004, 2012, and
2017.
Finally, since 2006 the European Commission
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has started trade negotiations with thirty-six non-EU
countries.

Fourteen of these have been concluded and

all include competition provisions.

The latest big

news in this context is of course the Economic
Partnership Agreement signed between the European
Union and Japan on July 17th of this year.
Another move that aims to seek common ground
for competition enforcers is the Multilateral
Framework on Procedures in Competition Law
Investigation and Enforcement (MFP) recently launched
by the U.S. DOJ.
Given our shared impetus to promote and
strengthen due process, the European Commission in
coordination with the other EU competition authorities
in the European Competition Network has engaged in
talks with the DOJ and other international partners to
better understand the objective of the MFP initiative
and to discuss how it could fit in with the decadeslong ongoing unsuccessful multilateral efforts to
promote legal procedural convergence, and this
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constructive conversation is ongoing.
Global procedural convergence plays an
important role to make sure competition authorities
can work together effectively on competition issues
that affect consumers and markets globally and ensure
due process and legal certainty for companies.

The

Commission fully supports and continues to actively
contribute to the important work on this issue in all
fora, and in the ICN and the OECD’s Competition
Committee in particular.
Let me recall just two examples of the
progress made this year.

In March the ICN adopted

Guiding Principles for Procedural Fairness in
Competition Agency Enforcement, and in June the OECD’s
Competition Committee launched a new project to
advance its work on transparency and procedural
fairness.
So we have a common goal. That is to make
sure that any new initiative strengthens
multilateralism and extends the reach, the
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effectiveness, and consistency of the principles that
we share.
All of this looks at the necessary framework
for cooperation among competition authorities.
Now I would like to give you a tangible
example of how cooperation works on the ground.

I

will look at the merger between Bayer and Monsanto
approved with matching remedies by the European
Commission last March and by the U.S. DOJ in May.
This was a large deal involving companies
with global operations.

The transaction was notified

to at least seventeen enforcement agencies.

In

situations of this complexity, it is crucial for the
companies that enforcers coordinate the process and
the substance of their reviews as they protect
consumer welfare in their respective jurisdictions.
This case was cooperation at its best.

It

was not a lucky outcome but the result of hard work to
conclude the case.

The Commission has actively

cooperated with as many as ten authorities.
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The most intense exchanges, as Makan knows
well, were with his agency.

Our team traveled to

Washington, D.C. for a dedicated workshop. We
exchanged the evidence found in our respective reviews
and we made sure that the remedies were fully
compatible and the time aligned.

In sum, we are

looking at a success cooperation story.
And this is not the only one.

We have

worked closely with the FTC, as well as with China’s
Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China
(MOFCOM), for instance in our review of ChemChina’s
acquisition of Syngenta.

Both the Commission and the

FTC cleared the acquisition with remedies, which
although they addressed concerns that were unique to
each market, were mutually compatible.

We also had

teams traveling between Washington, D.C. and Brussels
when we were reviewing the Dow/DuPont merger, to stick
to the agrochemical industry.
Of course, not all international cases
require the same degree of cooperation.
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globalization, many markets still show significant
difference.

Take AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner.

AT&T does have some business in Europe, but nothing
compared to its position in the United States, and
this explains why the case made waves in the United
States but was swiftly approved in Europe.
Conversely, there are cases that raise
serious concerns in the European Union but not in the
United States.

Deutsche Börse’s merger with NYSE

Euronext, for instance, was settled by the DOJ with
remedies; it was prohibited by the European Commission
because it would have resulted in a quasi-monopoly in
European financial derivatives traded on the
exchanges.
These are some of the reasons why I am
convinced that convergence and cooperation among
competition enforcers are simply a must in our global
age.

But our times are marked by the digital

revolution as much as by global economic integration.
I will therefore turn to my second line of argument,
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the enforcement approaches taken in the European Union
in the digital market.
Before I do, let me clarify that although I
am focusing on digital markets today, competition
policy and enforcement continue to take care of the
interests of law-abiding firms and the welfare of
consumers across all industries and markets in
Europe’s Single Market.

So there is not the tunnel

vision just on digital issues.
For example, since the start of 2017 the
European Commission took nine new cartel decisions,
imposing fines for a total of €2.75 billion.

Most of

these decisions were related to the automotive sector.
Also, last year the Commission took 380
merger decisions.

Apart from information and

communication technologies, the main sectors we worked
on included renewable energy, media, airlines, and the
agrochemical industries.
The point I am making here is that while we
follow digital markets in their evolution and
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anticipate the possible implications for competition
control, we keep looking at the economy as a whole.
We look into proposed mergers or conducts whenever
they raise competition concerns regardless of whether
they take place in the digital sector of other
industries, and we always closely analyze markets to
tailor EU competition policy and enforcement to their
specific features.
In digital markets, we often observe that
innovation plays a crucial role.

We also frequently

see network effects with the associated high switching
costs, multi-sided markets, and strong links between
adjacent markets.

Finally — but this is a common

observation — digital markets are places where
companies can grow very fast, which is of course not
in itself a competition concern.
I hasten to add that these observations
should not lead us to generalize.

Each market shows

its own features. However, when a digital market does
show these structural features, it can become tempting
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for a company to entrench its market position, take
advantage of “winner takes all” effects, and leverage
its dominance from one market to another.

These are

behaviors that may give rise to competition concerns
and call for the intervention of competition
enforcers.
In fact, there is great continuity between
the approach we follow in digital and other markets.
EU competition law principles are general and apply
across all sectors.

We assess every case, we look

into it on its own merit, we look at the factual
findings of our painstaking investigations, and we
assess them against our principles and laws.

This has

been the bedrock of our enforcement practice in the
European Union for over six decades, and we will keep
true to this orientation.
When it comes to digital companies, there is
no doubt they have produced great benefits for
consumers and society over the past few years and
decades, and will continue to do so.
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enforcers recognize these benefits and potential and
regard them as all the more reason to keep the Digital
Single Market open so that technology firms can
continue to give consumers more and more value.
We have just seen some of the features that
competition enforcers find in digital markets.

Now I

would like to show the role some of them had in a few
notable antitrust decisions taken by the Commission
this summer.
On July 18th the Commission found that Google
had engaged in conduct aimed at protecting and
strengthening its dominant position in general
Internet search through various restrictions in
relation to its Android mobile operating system.

The

case is essentially about three types of restrictions
that Google imposed on mobile device manufacturers and
network operators.
• First, Google made sure that its search
engine would be preinstalled on practically all
Android devices.
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app and the Chrome browser to the PlayStore, which
smartphone and tablet manufacturers see as a musthave.
• Second, Google paid mobile device
manufacturers and network operators to make sure that
its search engine would be the only one preinstalled
on many Android devices.
• Third, Google obstructed the development
of so-called “Android forks,” which are modified
versions of Android.

These forks could have provided

a launch pad for rival search engines and other app
developers.
In this way Google prevented competing
search engines from acquiring traffic and valuable
data which could have allowed them to improve their
products.
Beyond its own merits, the case is important
as it sets out a framework for the assessment of
anticompetitive conduct in the mobile sphere, in
particular with regard to the assessment of conduct
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resulting in the preinstallation of mobile software
applications.
The preinstallation and default setting of
apps can of course have beneficial effects for
consumers who can enjoy fully-functioning devices
immediately after purchase.

Some refer to this as the

“out of the box” experience.
However, preinstallation can also lead to
anticompetitive effects, and this can be particularly
the case when preinstallation of a tied app is imposed
as a condition to obtain another app which is in a
dominant position.

In these circumstances the

preinstallation of the tied app can reduce customers’
incentives to download competing apps and lead to the
foreclosure of credible competitors.
Whether the effects of preinstallation are
on balance positive or negative for competition and
consumers will ultimately depend on empirical
analysis.

Competition agencies are not new to this

type of assessment.
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looked at whether the preinstallation of Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer browser restricted competition in
the context of their respective antitrust
investigations.

The Commission also ran a similar

analysis in the context of the recent
Microsoft/LinkedIn merger case.

But this is the first

time the Commission has comprehensively assessed the
effects on competition of preinstallation in a mobile
Internet environment.
This assessment is strongly grounded on the
merits of the case and the evidence gathered.

For

example, we have found that on Android devices where
Google Search is preinstalled more than 95 percent of
all search queries were made via Google Search.

On

the other hand, on Windows mobile devices, where
Google Search was not preinstalled, less than 25
percent of all search queries were made via Google
Search.

This shows that preinstallation of Google

Search had a clear impact on the choice of consumers,
a choice that is influenced by the mere fact that the
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product is made available in a convenient and easy-touse way rather than by the actual merits and quality
of that product.
Let me also mention another aspect of the
case which is important from the policy perspective.
As part of its decision the Commission sanctioned
Google’s so-called “anti-fragmentation agreements,”
which in essence prevented device manufacturers from
shipping devices based on Android forks.

We have

investigated in detail this aspect of Google’s conduct
and concluded that it affected competition as it
deprived competing operating system developers from
the opportunity of finding partners that would
distribute devices based on their own implementations
of Android.
As part of this analysis we reviewed
internal documents showing that a number of device
manufacturers had an interest in shipping devices
based on Amazon’s version of Android, called Fire OS,
but were prevented from doing so due to Google’s
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conduct.
Thus, we are firmly convinced that our
analysis is fully in line with an effects-based
assessment and consistent with the caselaw of the
European Union’s courts, which for example have
already confirmed in the Microsoft case that
preinstallation by means of tying is capable of
foreclosing effective competition.
It is also consistent with our other recent
infringement actions which are also based on an
effects-based approach.

In this respect, let me

stress that when looking at how to prove
anticompetitive effects there is no place for
formalism.

There is not a single method or tool to

prove effects.

Different ways may be more or less

suitable depending on the circumstances of the case.
In the Google Shopping case, for example, we
looked at 5.2 terabytes of Google Search data to show
that Google’s illegal advantage granted to its own
comparison-shopping service was restricting
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competition.
In the Qualcomm exclusivity payments case,
we relied on a number of qualitative sources of
evidence which confirmed that Qualcomm’s exclusivity
payments influenced sourcing decisions.
As elsewhere in law enforcement, what
matters is that effects are established convincingly.
Other notable decisions the Commission took this
summer, certainly very important from a consumer point
of view, involved consumer electronics manufacturers’
Asus, Pioneer, Philips, and the Denon & Marantz Group.
In July the Commission imposed fines of more than €100
million on these companies for resale price
maintenance in online markets.
A prominent feature in these cases was the
use of pricing algorithms.

Many online retailers use

pricing software that automatically adjusts their own
retail prices to those of competitors by way of an
algorithm.

These cases show that resale price

maintenance practices when applied to low-pricing
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online retailers had a broader impact on the overall
prices for the consumer electronics products involved.
This is because the price increases were picked up
automatically by retail competitors using pricing
algorithms, including very big online players.
In addition, the growing use of automated
monitoring tools allowed the manufacturers to closely
track their retailers’ prices and swiftly intervene
when prices went down.
Another prominent feature of these four
cases is the development of the new cooperation
procedure outside the area of cartels that the
Commission inaugurated with the ARA case two years
ago.

Under the procedure companies may receive

reduced fines if they expressly acknowledge the
infringement and provide evidence that add significant
value to the evidence the Commission has already
gathered.

This allows the Commission to speed up

investigations, which may greatly increase the
relevance and impact of its decision particularly in
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digital industries.
The decisions involving consumer electronics
manufacturers followed a systemic inquiry of the Ecommerce sector that DG Competition conducted between
2015 and 2017.

The study is a contribution, one of

many, that competition policy and enforcement gives to
the Commission’s overall objective of bringing
Europe’s Single Market online.
Building the Single Market online and
offline means tearing down internal barriers to trade.
As seen, we are now following up the inquiry with
actual decisions.
before that.

But things began to improve even

When we launched the inquiry, many

companies started to remove on their own initiative
the online barriers that they had erected.
These cases are some illustrations of the
challenges that we find in digital markets in the
European Union and elsewhere.

The features I have

briefly reviewed were not all present in the same way
in the old economy, or even five years ago.
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Whilst this will not force an overhaul of
the legal frameworks in our respective jurisdictions,
we need to seriously reflect about how policy and
enforcement should evolve to stay ahead of the curve.
Recent initiatives taken in Washington, D.C. and in
Brussels go in this direction.

On this side of the

Atlantic, the Federal Trade Commission launched a
series of hearings and a process for written
contributions.

On the other shore, Commissioner

Vestager appointed in March a Panel of Special
Advisors on the Competition Implications of
Digitization.

The Commissioner also announced a

conference on data privacy platforms and innovation to
be held in Brussels in January 2019, and we have
launched a call for public contributions on these
topics.

I take this opportunity to invite you to send

us your written contributions by the end of September.
Initiatives such as these will help us
deepen the reflection to find common approaches in
this and other industries.
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share, even when we do not overlook the fact that our
respective jurisdictions have different economic
structures and that there is not a perfect overlap
between our legal and enforcement orientations in
every detail.
For example, some may be tempted to draw
analogies between EU competition law and the Supreme
Court’s recent American Express judgment.

I am not

sure that would be helpful because both EU and U.S.
competition laws take the two-sided nature of a market
into account, but they do so in different ways.
First, the anti-steering provisions at issue
in American Express are prohibited by law in the
European Union.

In a sense, EU views about anti-

steering provisions were so strong that the European
Union preferred to address them through regulation.
Second, under EU competition law the burden
of showing efficiencies falls on the defendant, not
the claimant, and in this respect the law leaves
little scope to offset harm in one market citing
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efficiencies in another market.
We also know that the overlap is not 100
percent in our approaches to some unilateral conduct
scenarios.

U.S. colleagues have underlined the gaps

in this area between EU competition law and U.S.
antitrust law showing that there are differences in
outcomes.

I think this is a correct reflection.

Sometimes there are also differences in objectives.
But this is part of the respectful and
fruitful debate among sister agencies I advocated in
the first part of my remarks today.

The debate is

possible in the first place because on both sides of
the Atlantic we share much more than separates us.
share an underlying notion of competition policy and
enforcement based on due process that takes an
evidence-based approach and that focuses on consumer
welfare.
Consensus around these and other broad
principles is strong, but we may still struggle with
the fine print.
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faced when we look at certain things from our
preconceptions with the problem that Saint Augustine
had with the concept of time:

“What then is time?” he

wrote, “If no one asks me, I know what it is.

If I

wish to explain it to him who asks, I do not know.”
Broad principles in competition control can
mask factual complexities and differences in value
judgments in specific situations.

But we cannot give

up on discussing these differences and trying to seek
convergence.

Whilst we need to proceed with caution

and mutual respect, we cannot be deterred.
Saint Augustine himself was not deterred
from the task of refining the explanation by its
innate difficulty.

Neither should we be.

The legal

standards we are bound to require it.
I would like to thank Fordham for giving us
a forum to pursue this noble endeavor, and I would
like to thank you for being part of it.
Makan made a musical analogy at the
beginning when he referred to Hotel California from
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the Eagles.

Let me end with a musical analogy that is

a tiny little bit younger than the Fordham Conference
but still from the 1970s, Fleetwood Mac’s Don’t Stop
Thinking About Tomorrow.

So let’s think together

about tomorrow.
* * *
MR. KEYTE:

There are a lot of incredibly

interesting and utterly complex things to take in from
both sets of remarks.
I will invite Makan and Johannes up to the
dais and then we’ll have some questions, which I will
lead off with.
Please, everybody, it’s a good time for
questions. You have them captive for fifteen or twenty
minutes.
The first one I had — I found it
interesting, Johannes, the discussion of how much
cooperation and work is done in the merger area.

I

was wondering — and maybe it’s what you were alluding
to — but from both of you, what are the efforts or
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planned efforts for exploring or undertaking that
level of discussion and cooperation with respect to
monopoly and dominance matters where there seems to be
still some significant degree of at least different
outcomes for similar conduct?
MR. DELRAHIM:

Let me put it this way.

I

think we might have similar concerns and how we
approach it might differ, and that only improves in
the same spirit of the improvements we continue to
have in the last thirty years by dialogue, by
explaining where we come from.
I recall we had a good meeting in Brussels
earlier this year where we had a very spirited and
good, positive discussion with the Commissioner, with
Johannes, with Carles, and others on the issue of
intellectual property and standard-setting
organizations, discussing why and where we come from
as far as the treatment of antitrust law in the
licensing of intellectual property in that type of a
context.

So we had that good discussion.
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one area where there has been, let’s say, further
enlightenment by the new administration in the U.S.
administration of that policy, I would point to that,
if there’s any area that our enforcement objectives
have changed.
We might be at different places at the
moment, but as we understand where we come from, what
are the economic underpinnings, we hopefully will
continue to converge on that area.
I mean certainly the digital area is one,
and we come to it from a perspective, particularly in
the unilateral conduct area, of avoiding falsepositives because of the harm that it could do to
consumers.

Helping each other understand where we

come from and recognizing the concerns across the
Atlantic.
MR. LAITENBERGER:
the remarks of Makan.

I would very much echo

This is not an issue where

there is one Big Bang moment, where we would sit
together, go over the issues once and for all, and
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then walk out with a Gospel.
I think this is a dialogue that takes place
in different occasions, in different fora, in
bilateral meetings as the ones that Makan has quoted
and that are frequent and regular and intense.
It is part of our multilateral discussions
in the different fora that have been abundantly
mentioned this morning, from the OECD to the ICN.
It is part also of the discussion of the
results of judicial review of what we do on both sides
of the Atlantic.

You mentioned, for instance, our

European Court of Justice’s Intel judgment, which has
also sparked interest on this side of the Atlantic.
Even if I have pointed to the limits of analogy
between the U.S. Supreme Court’s AMEX judgment and EU
competition law, it is certainly an issue that sparks
interest in the European Union as well.
So I think it is a very intensive process of
learning, of confronting what we know from the
markets, what is the evidence that we can gather, also
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the conclusions we draw.
I think it is indeed animated by a mutual
spirit to avoid both false-positives and falsenegatives.

From our point of view, there is not a

“good false” and a “bad false” — false is false — so
overenforcement is as bad as underenforcement.

In

that respect, learning from each other is a very
important part of the work of competition agencies.
MR. KEYTE:

All right.

Thank you.

Questions?
QUESTION:
work at Qualcomm.

My name is Koren Wong-Ervin and I
My question is my own.

I was thinking.

In both of your remarks I

was struck by the use of the word “effects-based
analysis” and was hoping you would talk more about
what that really means to you.

It seems to me that

all antitrust is really effects-based; it’s just that
truncated analysis sort of harnesses decision theory
to come up with sort of shorthand analysis.
When you’re talking about effects-based,
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particularly for vertical restraints, how do you
decide to use a truncated analysis?

What do you think

of some of the meta-studies by Francine Lafontaine and
Margaret Slade, or Daniel O’Brien or others, that say
vertical restraints are generally procompetitive or
benign and should have a full-blown effects-based
analysis?
If you could just talk more about what you
mean by effects-based and when you decide to use
truncated analysis and how?
MR. LAITENBERGER:

I think when it comes to

the standard and the methods for an effects-based
analysis the most recent guidance in Europe is the
European Court of Justice’s Intel judgment.

I think

indeed that this judgment has given us very solid
ground to stand upon.
Even if it is related to a specific type of
behavior, exclusivity rebates by dominant firms, and
even if the specifics of the behavior cannot be
transposed mechanically to other conduct, I think when
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it comes to general principles the Intel judgment
offers very precious guidance.
What does it say in a sense?

It reconfirms

an earlier jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice that says that a certain type of behavior is
capable of restricting competition unless otherwise
proven.
So in a sense, we have a presumption.
that is rebuttable.

But

We can say as a starting point

that there is a concern.

But if the firm or the firms

concerned rebut this presumption, then we need to show
that there is the capability of restricting
competition in a specific situation.
I think what is also very important here is
that when it comes to the evidence that we need to
look at, the Court is very clear we need to take into
account all the evidence; but it is equally clear that
we need to take into account all the relevant
evidence.
So this is not in the rebuttal, if I may say
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so, of the presumption a question of having abstract
arguments.

The starting point is there is a concern.

If this concern can be dispelled, then it’s all fine,
there is no case.

But if this concern cannot be

concretely dispelled, then there is a problem.
I mentioned the first test case, so to say,
of our reading of this judgment, which was the
Qualcomm exclusivity payments decision earlier this
year.

What have we done here?

I think we have built

a very clear effects-based analysis based on
qualitative evidence showing that there was indeed the
capability of foreclosing competition.

At the same

point in time we have also looked at the price/cost
test that was submitted by the party, and we found it
wanting and not something that would have invalidated
the qualitative analysis that we have put forward.
So this is one illustration of this
principle, and I think in this sense the Intel
judgment has given us clear, practicable, and a fully
fair standard of looking at evidence and effects.
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MR. DELRAHIM:

In the United States,

regardless of how you label it, vertical restraints is
I think a good example.

Not directly on point in what

you were talking about, and without commenting on any
specific case whether in Europe or elsewhere, for a
number of reasons, as a matter of general policy, I’d
look at the U.S. government’s brief in the American
Express case as far as that test, particularly for
two-sided markets.
We took a very conscious position with
vertical restraints, as opposed to horizontal.

We

have Supreme Court precedent as far as when you apply
the rule of reason, the procompetitive justifications
of a particular restraint.

You look at Professional

Engineers and NCAA in the Supreme Court, where it’s
not cognizable, and you look at when you apply the
test.
There was a lot of effort and some
discussions, and perhaps prior briefs, even in that
same case, in the American Express case, where it said
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in a vertical restraint you apply the rule of reason;
however, the procompetitive justifications are noncognizable, which as a matter of policy — first of
all, it wasn’t mandated by the Supreme Court; and, as
a matter of policy, I thought that would be a wrong
policy to set for our economy.
So we advanced a test that said in a twosided market you should recognize you apply the rule
of reason, as long as it’s constrained by
interdependence of the markets, and you should
recognize that and you should recognize the
procompetitive justifications in a vertical for a
number of reasons, because the effects it would have
in the market would be different than in a horizontal
restraint.

But I would say that that should animate

as far as where our position is going to be from an
enforcement standpoint.
And we look at the exclusionary effect:

is

there a particular conduct that excludes the
competitors from that market?
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— payments could be exactly what the market calls for
because with those rebates and payments you are
competing on that level.

So you have to take a look

at the effects it would have to exclude a new
competitor that would challenge the position, if there
is a position of dominance in that marketplace, by
that incumbent who might be engaging in it.
MR. KEYTE:
QUESTION:

Another question?
David Sutcliffe, Sports

Technology.
There are a lot of books and articles
written about the “winner take all” economy.

When we

have Amazon hitting a $1 trillion market cap, that
would tend to tell some of us in the audience that
there seems to be a monopoly situation.
So I’ve got a two-part question.

One is,

when will the Justice Department look at breaking up
Amazon; and when will the European Commission look at
taking more aggressive action against the platforms,
such as Google and Facebook, for dominating the
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digital economy?

I don’t think that the consumer wins

by having Amazon paying $9.75 an hour with no benefits
because you get 10 percent off on your next purchase.
Thank you.
MR. DELRAHIM:

Thank you for that question

as we alternate on these.
We chuckle, but it’s a very important
question.

Why is it an important question?

For two

reasons.
The first may be not so important, but when
we would engage in an investigation or something, when
would we do that?

The most important thing is, can we

get clearance with our friends at the Federal Trade
Commission?

We have two agencies and we have to see

if there is a particular conduct.
clearance issue.

We don’t know.

So that’s the whole
Our friends maybe at

the Federal Trade Commission — like they did in Google
— but different agencies would look at the conduct.
But let me get to the issue of exactly what
you said about Amazon.
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and I’m inspired.

I don’t know how many times I’ve

read that speech in 1940 in the Great Hall of the
Justice Department, to the Second Conference of the
Federal Prosecutors given by Robert H. Jackson.
Why?

Because he said it’s really important

for us as law enforcement agencies to pick cases based
on conduct, not based on the subject, of wrongdoing.
Where you have credible evidence of anticompetitive
conduct, a violation of the law, it’s just as
important whether it’s here or a violation of a
computer crime or a violation of a drug law.
Why is that?

Because the prosecutor has

more control over every one of ours, including
businesses, but individual liberties.
Why is that?

Because even in 1940 — that’s

eighty years ago — he said there are enough laws on
the books that if you targeted a single individual or
company with the force that the federal prosecutor
has, there’s anybody, virtually anybody — and back
then the federal laws were probably this big
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[indicating] and now the federal laws are probably
three volumes of this depth — you can find a violation
of the federal laws by anybody.

Not a single person

in this room if they were targeted would escape
liability I would submit.
Something — Wire Act.

You were still at

work and your wife says, “Are you on your way?”
honey, I was.”

Is that a fraud?

“Yes,

Some prosecutor

could come up with that — maybe not Jim Comey, but
others could.

[Laughter]

But let me mention why is that important?
Because you don’t just go after companies.
should be a standard.

There

There should be credible

evidence of a violation of the law.
Now, if there are — and we won’t talk about
any individual investigation — but we have not been
shy at the Justice Department about bringing cases,
whether it has been against powerful political
interests like Microsoft, or even more powerful
political interests like AT&T.
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If there is credible evidence, I’ve invited
folks to bring it to us.

Just because somebody is big

does not mean they have violated the laws, nor should
we in any condemn them because they have succeeded.
MR. KEYTE:

I think Johannes pretty much

addressed in his remarks the answer to that question.
But let me ask a fairly technical follow-up actually
to that question — and it will be our last question —
which relates to the subject of network effects.
A lot of what we’re talking about here is
the digital economy platform competition where
consumers benefit and like the product so much it
creates what everybody recognizes as a network effect.
You have different laws in the United
States, where even if that does in some sense deter
entry, make it difficult to enter, arguably it’s not
conduct that is exclusionary in any way.
My first question for Johannes on this is:
How do you in the “as-efficient competitor” test —
which we really don’t deal with in the United States —

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

70

deal with network effects, where they get the benefit
of the efficiencies of the network effect?

How do

network effects match up with that test, if that’s the
right question?
MR. LAITENBERGER:

I would like maybe to

make, first, a more fundamental point.

Obviously, the

preceding* question betrays a deep concern, and I
think it’s a concern that many people share all over
the world.
This being said, I would also like to
underline that size and success in themselves are not
a competition concern.

The question is always how

size and success come about.

So our EU law standard

is not that dominance is in itself an issue; the abuse
of dominance is.

That indeed raises specific

analytical issues in fields where direct network
effects, indirect network effects, network effects
through learning by doing, may create certain
dynamics, for instance of lock-in, which then in turn,
and in particular, if there is a tipping point from
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where on the market is not really open anymore, or at
least the barriers to entry become very important,
could put an incentive to anticompetitive behavior.
But of course, we need to look at all times
at is there an abusive conduct that we can show.

I

think we have done so in the cases that we have
identified — in the Google Shopping case, in the
Google Android case, in other cases.
Now, what does the “as-efficient competitor”
test mean intrinsically?

It means that we have to

look at whether a competitor with the same costs could
in the same conditions enter the market.

I think we

have looked at this also in the context of the cases
that I have mentioned, and that we have found indeed
that a competitor with the same cost structure under
these circumstances and faced with this behavior could
not penetrate the market successfully.
MR. DELRAHIM:

It’s an important issue and

why we continue to need to study the network effects
on the competition area.
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hear Johannes talk about convergence.
Big is not bad, but big behaving badly is
bad.

Just because you’re a tech company, you’re not

per se illegal.

But if there is conduct that you are

engaging in — again Microsoft is a relatively recent
but good example of how the U.S. laws approached that,
despite many arguments made by the company.
The network effects of some of these
platforms is a fascinating issue, partly because the
consumer has been benefitting from having that
network, and that’s why they gravitate to it.

As much

as I dislike the amount of time my wife spends on
Facebook, there’s a lot of people, billions of people,
who seem to like it.

I’m not on it.

But it is one

where they enjoy that interaction.
But we also must not forget that for every
one of these upstart companies there were upstarts,
there were others.
efficient.

They displaced somebody less-

For a Facebook there was a MySpace, if

somebody in this room might remember what they were.
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For a Google there was an AltaVista and, God
knows, seven or eight search engines before they came
about.

In fact, I was reading a book about their

investors by John Doerr.

One of the big challenges of

investing in Google, in those two young Stanford guys,
was the fact that there were already seven folks in
the marketplace, and how could they overcome the
competition.
Bing as well.

I guess there’s this little thing called
But they have dominated.

Now the question is:

What should antitrust

policy look for based on what we know now?

What we

need to know now and what our enforcement efforts
should focus on is making sure the incentives are
there for that upstart that challenges those folks.
There would be nothing better for the market than if
there was a new, more-efficient search engine.
yet to see it.

I have

I don’t particularly care about any

particular company — I don’t know about you guys — but
I probably go to Google a dozen times, and some of
that is just because I’m too lazy to put in a
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particular URL, so I just go to Google, it does that,
and then it clicks through, and they’re probably
making money for every ad that’s displayed to me
through that laziness.

But it would be great for

another company.
What we need to make sure are two things,
and we need to be very specific about that.

Do we

have and preserve a place and the policies in place to
allow for that incentive for that next company to come
in?
Second, are they doing anything — is any of
their conduct in any way limiting the ability of that
upstart to challenge their market position in that
market that they’re dominating?

Not necessarily

others, but there the challenge — and that’s what I
think the great opinion in the D.C. Circuit taught us
in the Microsoft case — is there a challenge to the
innovation that is coming and are they keeping and
stifling that competition?

Some of the facts in the

Microsoft case showed that it wasn’t because they were
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necessarily big; it was that they were threatened by
the challenge to the network effects of the
application programming that was created, you could
only write to the operating system of which they had
90 percent of the market share; and the Internet
browser was creating now a middleware, that the
applications no longer were enslaved to the operating
system, but now you can write to multiple browsers.
Sun at the time and Netscape had created that, and
they took a number of actions to prevent that
specifically with the intent to maintaining that
monopoly.
That’s always a good example for us to
follow and make sure that these companies, which might
have a lot of market share and dominance — whether
it’s search, whether it is in shopping — is that next
competitor that can displace them there and are they
taking any action to prevent them from being able to
compete with them.
MR. LAITENBERGER:
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small additional remark?
I’m sometimes puzzled that the discussion on
the benefits and the efficiencies of network effects
stops at the very early level of analysis, namely at a
level of analysis where people can show there is a
benefit there.
The question may also be: Are all the
benefits there?

Do we live in a world where just

because in a certain place network effects lead to
certain outcomes, this is the only or the best
possible outcome?
I think here we need to keep the space open,
as also Makan has just said, for innovation, for
alternative solutions, for better solutions.
But, of course, then it is not because there
are network effects around a certain product this is
in itself the problem.

The problem would be if the

network effects pose incentives for anticompetitive
behavior and then there is engagement in this
anticompetitive behavior.
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But as much as I would urge against a
presumption that big is necessarily bad, I would also
urge against a presumption that tech is necessarily
procompetitive and never anticompetitive.

To really

go to the bottom of it we need the evidence, we need
the effects-based analysis, and we need to keep all of
this administrable — but that is another discussion
for another panel at another day.
MR. KEYTE:

Thank you very much.

For those interested in this exact debate
with different names, go read the Schumpeter-Arrow
debate, because that’s what we just had.
Please join me in thanking our keynote
speakers for a wonderful discussion and presentations.
Let’s come back in ten minutes to talk about
Antitrust and Populism.
[Break: 10:58 a.m.]
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